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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the LLM in Transnational and European 
Commercial Law, Banking Law and Arbitration/Mediation at the International Hellenic 
University.  
 
The 2008/2009 Global Financial Crisis uncovered deep fissures in the financial system 
the initial response towards the combat of which was the extensive use of public funds 
to rescue ailing too-big-to-fail financial institutions. The resulting strong public outcry 
and detrimental effect on government finances led to the adoption of a wave of reforms 
trying to limit the impact any future crisis would have on taxpayers, such as the Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive and the Crisis Communications, now constituting the 
backbone of the access and use of State Aid. In them, through an array of provisions the 
legislators have tried to balance the texts’ varying objectives of competition policy and 
financial stability, providing for an increase in burden sharing requirements whilst still 
keeping the door open for the application of bail-outs in worst-case-scenarios. With the 
issue of Non-Performing Loans looming in the background, and having examined in 
detail the interplay of the aforementioned texts, this dissertation attempts to comment 
on the stance taken in the in 2018 published AMC Blueprint regarding the 
abovementioned debate and to establish where it fits in the overall interaction of the 
abovementioned frameworks. 
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Introduction 
The 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) found the financial sector and by 
extension the regulatory world wholly unprepared by uncovering previously undetected 
deep running fissures in the financial system. With governments struggling to limit the 
outfall of ailing too-big-to-fail (TBTF) financial institutions moving towards unorderly 
bankruptcy, the deep reach into public pockets seemed at the time inevitable, despite 
the therewith associated strong public outcry. In Europe alone, in the period between 
2008 and 2017 the Commission approved State aid to banks amounting to EUR 5.118 
billion, with EUR 3.457,5 billion having been granted in the first year alone.1 And yet 
Europe did not have a particular set of legislation in place addressing State aid control 
in the financial sector at the outburst of the crisis. Instead, a wave of Communications 
was adopted by the Commission,2 creating a temporary State aid regime complementing 
Article 107 TFEU and attempting to first regulate and then minimise the reliance on 
public money whilst preserving financial stability. This objective was then further 
pursued through the adoption of Directive 2014/59/EU,3 which introduced the widely 
revered bail-in tool, requiring the initial absorption of any losses encountered by 
financial institutions to occur through a write down of their internal resources, namely 
those provided by shareholders and creditors, whilst under very strict circumstances still 
                                                        
1 European Commission, ‘State Aid Scoreboard 2018’ (European Commission, 24.01.2019) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/index_en.html> accessed 25 January 2019. 
2 European Commission, The application of state aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial 
institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis [2008] OJ C270/8 (‘2008 Banking 
Communication’); The recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial crisis: limitation of 
aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition [2009] OJ C10/2 
(‘Recapitalization Communication’); Communication from the Commission on the treatment of impaired 
assets in the Community financial sector [2009] C72/1 (‘Impaired Asset Communication’); Commission 
communication on the return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the financial 
sector in the current crisis under the State aid rules [2009] OJ C195/9 (‘Restructuring Communication’); 
Communication from the Commission on the application from 1 January 2011, of State aid rules to support 
measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis [2010] OJ C329/7 (‘2010 Prolongation 
Communication’); Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 January 2012, of State 
aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis [2011] OJ C356/7 
(‘2011 Prolongation Communication’); Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 
August 2013, of State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis 
(‘Banking Communication’) [2013] OJ C216/1. 
3 Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), 2014/59/EU, Recital 67. 
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allowing for the application of a measure akin to the old bail-out regime, i.e. 
precautionary recapitalisation. 
Now, more than 10 years after the onset of the crisis, and despite the 
introduction of the new State aid and bank recovery and resolution regime, Europe has 
still not fully recovered. In its Communication on completing the Banking Union4 the 
European Commission emphasised the need for further risk reduction, focusing on the 
reduction of institutions’ exposures to non-performing loans (NPLs), due to their 
implications for the profitability and viability of affected banks and the hampering of 
their economic growth.  
The issue is not novel. Since the outset of the crisis the Commission has used 
State aid control to incentivise banks to manage and reduce their impaired assets, 
oftentimes through the creation of asset management companies (AMCs), such as in 
Ireland, Slovenia and Spain, requiring in depth restructuring and burden-sharing for the 
to be recapitalised banks, and for those whose viability cannot be restored, the 
reduction of NPLs in light of actions like orderly liquidation plans approved by the 
Commission under State aid rules.5 In March 2018 the Commission made good on its 
promise to introduce a comprehensive package of measures to address NPLs, including 
in its proposal a technical blueprint on the setting up of national AMCs focusing on best 
practices learned from past experiences in Member States.6  
The introduction of this new measure refocuses the discussion regarding State 
aid in the financial sector as it establishes a number of common principles to be followed 
during the set-up, governance and operation of AMCs in order for them to be compliant 
with the ever more complex State aid rules. It does not, however, aim to provide the 
broader picture of the interaction and interconnectedness of the various aspects of 
current State aid rules and references thereto in the array of legislation applicable to 
ailing institutions at the moment, nor does it showcase the different approaches taken 
                                                        
4 European Commission, Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Central 
Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on completing 
the Banking Union [2017] COM (2017) 592 final. 
5 Ibid. 16. 
6 European Commission – Press Release, Reducing Risk in the Banking Union: Commission presents 
measures to accelerate the reduction of non-performing loans in the banking sector, [14 March 2018] < 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-1802_en.htm> accessed 25 January 2019. 
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to State aid throughout them and their justification. This, instead, is the aim of this 
dissertation, in the pursuit of which, first, a general overview of the concept of State aid 
will be provided and its basic principles set out, followed by a description of the current 
State aid regime applicable to financial institutions. Second, the approach taken to State 
aid throughout the resolution framework will be analysed, with a focus on the BRRD, 
the bail-in tool and its exceptions. Special attention will be given to the interaction of 
the bail-in tool with the precautionary recapitalisation tool. In a final step, the new AMC 
Blueprint will be examined in reference to the State aid principles it is based on, and its 
overall attitude towards State aid will be evaluated. 
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Chapter One: The European Union State Aid Framework: Principles and 
Evolution 
State aid control has been a permanent fixture in the EU since before the onset 
of the crisis, with Article 107 TFEU being its legislative basis. Article 108 TFEU, in fact, 
imbues the Commission with the competence of determining whether a measure 
constitutes State aid in the sense of Article 107 TFEU.7 
The Commission first became aware of the role it would be called to play in the 
years to come when initial struggles of Northern Rock and several of the German 
Landesbanken came to light in 2007.8 On several occasions, it appears that the 
Commission, was the only thing that stood between certain economic demise of the 
extent last seen during the Great Depression and a more measured fate,9 especially 
considering the absence of a supranational regime prepared to deal with the incoming 
crisis. In this regard, its commitment to its imperative of overseeing each Member 
State’s intervention in their banking sector, whilst preventing any further destabilisation 
of the financial system or damage to the single market for European Banking, was 
essential.10 At a time of strong defiance and pressure from Member States to set aside 
State aid rules11 this move indicated a shift not only in the Commission’s policy priorities, 
but also in the overall approach taken towards State aid control as such, which moved 
away from being a pure competition policy device and towards being an important 
market stabilisation tool. In order for this evolution and the reasons behind it to become 
apparent, however, one must first come to understand the historical notion of State aid, 
its function, its forms of application and why when it comes to the financial sector, 
institutions cannot be dealt with in the same manner as conventional companies 
receiving state support.  
                                                        
7 TFEU Article 108(3). 
8 Neelie Kroes, Competition policy and the crisis – the Commission’s approach to banking and beyond,  
[2010] Competition Policy Newsletter, 3. 
9  ibid. 
10 Francesco De Cecco, ‘State Aid Law Meets Financial Regulation’ in Joanna Gray and Orkun Akseli (eds), 
Financial Regulation in Crisis? The Role of Law and the Failure of Northern Rock (Edward Elgar 2011). 
11 Kroes, n 8, 3. 
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1. The	concept	of	State	Aid		
Article 107 TFEU establishes a general prohibition of the provision of State aid by 
Member States. Whilst the article does not provide a definition of State aid, it does set 
out the cumulative criteria the fulfilment of which is to be assessed when examining 
whether an action can be characterised as proscribed. According to it,12 State aid control 
is primarily a competition measure, aimed at controlling market players and ensuring a 
level playing field between them to further promote the fostering of trust and equal 
opportunity between Member States, by securing that no financial or economic 
advantage is given to a firm through State intervention which would otherwise not have 
been enjoyed13 under ‘normal market conditions’.14 This requirement is fulfilled when 
the public authority granting the measure in question acts as a private investor,15 for the 
evaluation of which the Market Economy Investor Principle (MEIP) is used.16  
According to this principle, the behaviour of a private investor establishes a 
benchmark which is considered to reflect normal market conditions, the evaluation of 
which in turn is most frequently undertaken using the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM).17 CAPM reflects the minimum risk premium an investor would demand above 
the risk-free rate of investment, usually equal to the long-term yield of government 
bonds, which would adequately compensate them for the undertaking of additional, 
otherwise diversifiable, according to the market portfolio efficiency assumption, risk.18 
As such, it follows, that should the rate of return a Member State makes on an 
investment into its economy differ from the risk and, thus, rate of return a market 
                                                        
12 The direct working of Article 107(1) TFEU being: “any aid granted by a Member State or through State 
resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, 
be incompatible with the internal market.” 
13 ECJ, Case 61/79 Amministrazione delle Finanze v Denkavit italiana [1980] ECR 1205. 
14 ECJ, Case C-39/94 SFEI v La Poste [1996] ECR I-3547, para 60. 
15 Phedon Nicolaides, ‘State aid to banking: application of the market economy investor principle’ in 
François-Charles Leprévote, Joanna Gray and Francesco de Cecco (ed.), Research Handbook on State Aid 
in the Banking Sector, (Edward Elgar, 2017) 87. 
16 Juan Jorge Piernas Lopez, ‘The Evolving Nature of the Notion of Aid under EU Law‘ [2016] European 
State Aid Law Quarterly, 400, 405. 
17 Nicolaides, n 15, 88.  
18 Shannon P. Pratt, Roger J. Grabowski, Cost of capital: applications and examples, (5th edn. Wiley, 2014) 
191. 
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investor would be willing to accept, the investment is to be characterised as unlawful 
aid.19 
 
2. Forms	of	State	Aid	
In the cases in which aid has been granted to financial institutions during the 
crisis it has taken on the forms of recapitalisations, guarantees, other liquidity measures, 
and impaired asset measures (IAMs).20 Whilst the various forms of liquidity measures 
are designed to improve the recipient’s access to funding (‘non-structural’ measures), 
recapitalisations and IAMs are aimed at addressing specific balance sheet deficiencies 
(‘structural’ measures).21 All of these when granted by the State can constitute 
“measures which provide unwarranted and selective advantages to some firms, thereby 
decreasing overall European competitiveness.”22 
a. Liquidity	Support	
Liquidity support is granted to institutions which need assistance in re-
establishing confidence in them in the financial markets to be able to continue normal 
operations. The emphasis is on securing access to funding. The support can be divided 
into direct and indirect support, depending on whether access to funding is provided to 
the institution directly or through a guarantee.  
Direct liquidity support can take on the form of the provision of credit lines, 
loans, and the lending and/or sale of government bonds by the State or a central bank 
to be used as collateral in refinancing transactions or repurchasing operations, aimed at 
avoiding bank failure due to lack of the bank’s access to funding when the markets have 
dried out.23 Indirect liquidity support, on the other hand, aims at increasing institutions’ 
                                                        
19 ECJ, Case 234/84 Belgium v Commission [986] ECR 2263, para 14; ECJ, Case C-305/89 Italy v Commission 
(Alfa Romeo) [1991] ECR I-1603, para 19ff; ECJ Case C-482/99 France v Commission (Stardust Marine) 
[2002] ECR I-4397, para 69ff.  
20 European Commission, ‘State Aid Scoreboard 2018’ (European Commission, 24.01.2019) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/index_en.html> accessed 25 January 2019. 
21 François-Charles Leprévote, Florine Coupé, ‘The Sates’ toolkit for rescuing banks in difficulty’ in 
François-Charles Leprévote, Joanna Gray and Francesco de Cecco (ed.), Research Handbook on State Aid 
in the Banking Sector (Edward Elgar, 2017) 107, 110. 
22 European Commission, State Aid Action Plan: Less and Better Targeted State Aid: A Roadmap for State 
Aid Reform 2005-2009, COM (2005) 107 Final 5 (June 2005). 
23 Leprévote, Coupé, n 21, 110, 112. 
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own access to private funding through the enhancement of their creditworthiness 
through the provision of guarantees.24 In this case the State provides a legally 
enforceable commitment agreeing to fulfil institutions’ obligations towards third parties 
should the institutions fail to perform them.25 This places institutions in a better position 
by re-establishing confidence in them. By allowing institutions to profit from the more 
favourable credit profile of the guarantor, it allows them to raise funding from the 
market having reduced counterparty risk for the investor.26 In the cases in which the 
market, however, remains unresponsive the guaranteed debt instruments often serve 
as collateral for the provision of more direct liquidity assistance from the European 
Central Bank (ECB).27 This was the case with the provision of Emergency Liquidity 
Assistance (ELA) to Greek banks in 2015.28  
Especially in the cases of ELA provided by the Central Bank, State aid is usually 
considered to be involved due to the existence of State guarantees, as was the case in 
the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund’s (HFSF) recapitalisation commitments to ailing 
Greek banks.29 However, liquidity assistance provided by central banks does not follow 
the same concepts as other liquidity measures, as the provision of it constitutes one of 
the main monetary policy instruments in the toolkit of a central bank,30 with the 
objective of securing not only financial but also monetary stability of the wider economy. 
As such, State aid rules are largely expected to not intervene with the normal monetary 
operations of the central bank, and will not do so as long as the conditions set out in the 
2013 Banking Communication are met.31 Only should this not be the case, will the 
                                                        
24 Ibid 118. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Violeta Iftinchi, 'State aid and the financial sector: the evolution of the legal framework of State 
aid law' in François-Charles Leprévote, Joanna Gray and Francesco de Cecco (ed.) Research Handbook on 
State Aid in the Banking Sector (Edward Elgar, 2017), 54, 56. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Commission Decision C(2014) 4662 on the HFSF Recapitalisation commitment to Alpha Bank (Case 
SA.34823 (2012/C)) [2015] OJ L80/1; Commission Decision C(2014) 5201 on the HFSF Recapitalisation 
commitment to National Bank of Greece (Case SA.34824 (2012/C)) [2015] OJ L183/29; Commission 
Decision C(2014) 2933 on the HFSF Recapitalisation commitment to EFG Eurobank (Case SA.34825 
(2012/C)) [2014] OJ L357/112; Commission Decision C(2014) 5217 on the HFSF Recapitalisation 
commitment to Piraeus Bank (Case SA.34826 (2012/C)) [2015] OJ L80/49. 
30 Rosa Maria Lastra, International Financial and Monetary Law (2nd edn. OUP, 2015) 47. 
31 According to Section 5 of the 2013 Banking Communication, central bank liquidity support will not be 
considered State aid as long as at the time the liquidity support is provided the institution to which it is 
being provided is solvent, the liquidity support is not part of a larger package of support measures being 
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liquidity support provided run the risk of falling within the ambit of the State aid 
framework. 
b. Capital	Support	
Capital support is a measure whose instigation was due to the deepening 
recession during the crisis, which led banks to the reduction of their levels of financial 
leverage through the limitation of lending to the real economy, creating the need to 
increase the capital base of some of the most affected institutions.32 This support will 
usually take on the form of a direct injection of capital into the bank’s structure 
(recapitalisation), which will be reflected on its balance sheet in order for it to meet 
capital requirements.33 Contrary to liquidity support, in which merely access to funding, 
i.e. liquidity, is provided, capital support takes on the form of a direct recapitalisation of 
the institution, in the sense that the State itself subscribes to capital instruments issued 
by the banks.34 These instruments can be core equity, alternative Tier 1 or Tier 2 
instruments, or even contingent convertible bonds.35 Such recapitalisations constitute 
State aid when the purchase of the instruments occurs above market price or without 
complying with the remuneration principles set out in the State aid framework.36  
c. Impaired	Asset	Measures	
However, especially in times of strong economic destabilisation, capital 
injections and general liquidity measures are often not enough in order to restore 
market confidence in ailing financial institutions. This requires the restructuring of ailing 
banks, which includes the process of “cleansing” the banks’ balance sheets of toxic 
assets.37 For this purpose, Member States often invest in special vehicles, which are 
owned, funded or guaranteed by the State and called “bad banks” or “asset 
                                                        
provided to the institution, the central bank obtains collateral for the entire amount of liquidity provided, 
it charges a punitive interest rate for its provision and, finally, no State guarantee is provided on the loan 
given from which the central bank would profit should the originating bank default on its payment. 
32 Piotr Podsiadło, ‘The Interference of Law and Economics: The Case of Guarantees for Bank Debt and 
Their Impact on the Competitiveness of the EU Member States’ [2016] European State Aid Law Quarterly 
72, 78. 
33 Iftinchi, n 27, 57.  
34 Leprévote, Coupé, n 21, 128. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 131. 
37 Ibid.  
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management companies”. These then purchase the afflicted assets, transferring the 
therewith affiliated risk from the banks’ balance sheets to their own, and alleviate the 
banks of their burden.38 Prominent examples of such vehicles were the National Asset 
Management Agency (NAMA) operating in Ireland and SAREB39 in Spain.  
Alternatively, IAMs can be provided without the transfer of ownership of the 
toxic asset. This requires the State to commit to indemnify banks for any losses 
exceeding a set amount connected with a specific well-identified asset group,40 in 
essence guaranteeing its quality and otherwise providing a backstop in cases of 
unfavourable developments.41 Finally, impaired asset relief can be granted through the 
setting up of bad banks partly owned by the beneficiary themselves or through the 
introduction of cash flow swaps.42 
3. Derogation	from	the	General	State	Aid	Prohibition	
However, as briefly indicated before, despite the general prohibition, not all 
State aid is unlawful, with Article 107 TFEU itself allowing for derogations to it in its 
second and third section. The Commission may, as such, approve particular forms of 
State aid which it determines to be “compatible” with the Single Market.43 In fact, the 
purpose of the application of the MEIP44 is not to prevent State intervention in the 
economy altogether, but instead, to inject accountability into the relationship between 
the State and the market.45 As such, the burden of proof lies with the Member State to 
show that any proposed aid measures satisfy the conditions for their approval.46 
                                                        
38 Iftinchi, n 27, 58. 
39 Sociedad de Gestión de Activos procedentes de la Reestructuración Bancaria (Spanish) - Company for 
the Management of Assets proceeding from Restructuring of the Banking System (English) 
40 The Impaired Asset Communication at the time set the requirement for the assets to have already been 
on the bank’s balance sheet before 31 December 2008 to be eligible. 
41 Iftinchi, n 27, 58. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Jonathan M. DeVito, ‘The Role of Competition Policy and Competition Enforcers in the EU Response to 
the Financial Crisis: Applying the State Aid Rules of the TFEU to Bank Bailouts in Order to Limit Distortions 
of Competition in the Financial Sector’ [2011] American Antitrust Institute Working Paper No. 11-01, 5. 
44 See Chapter 1, Section 1. 
45 Joanna Gray, Francesco de Cecco, ‘Competition, Stability and Moral Hazard: the tension between 
financial regulation and State aid control’ in François-Charles Leprévote, Joanna Gray and Francesco de 
Cecco (ed.), Research Handbook on State Aid in the Banking Sector (Edward Elgar, 2017) 20, 30. 
46 Philip Marsden, Ioannis Kokkoris, ‘The Role of Competition and State Aid Policy in Financial and 
Monetary Law’ [2010] 13(3) Journal of International Economic Law 875, 886; ECJ, Case C-364/90 Italy v 
Commission [1993] ECR I-2097. 
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Until the outburst of the crisis, most aid was being assessed and approved on the 
basis of Article 107(3)(c) TFEU.47 However, the severity of the crisis led to a gradual shift 
in the Commission’s State aid policy, underlined by the fact that for the first time in over 
thirty years, and despite initial rejection of its application during the beginning of the 
crisis as in the Northern Rock case,48 the Commission allowed for the application of 
Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, something which prior to that point had only ever occurred on 
three occasions over a period of fifty years.49 According to Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, aid 
can be considered as compatible with the internal market when it is granted ‘to remedy 
a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State’. This derogation from the rule 
is to be interpreted very narrowly, with the rationale behind it being strictly the 
absorption of shocks caused by serious economic turmoil, and with no recipient 
undertaking to be placed in a stronger position than it would have had been prior to the 
disturbance.50 The application of the wording of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU opened up the 
possibility of adapting the then existing State aid rules to reflect the urgency of the state 
of the financial system for the benefit of which State aid was being granted.51 
4. The	Tension	Between	Bank	Regulation	and	State	Aid	Control	
Whilst the European economy at large relies on competition in order to provide 
the fundamental incentives for businesses to innovate and increase their efficiency by 
ensuring a level playing field for all market participants, the balance struck between 
competition and systemic stability is far more fragile.  
Banks in and of themselves are inherently frail creatures. This is ascribed as being 
a consequence of the concept of maturity mismatch, which lies at the centre of the 
intermediated system, constituting the basic operational model of modern banking.  
                                                        
47 Article 107(3)(c) TFEU permits ‘aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities [...] 
where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary’ to the goals of the 
Single Market. 
48 Christopher Vajda QC, ‘The banking crisis and the EC State Aid rules’ [2009] 2 JIBFL 67, 69; Georgios 
Kamaris,‘A Critical Analysis of the European Union’s State Aid Policy Implementation [2013] 127 < 
https://bura.brunel.ac.uk/bitstream/2438/8089/1/FulltextThesis.pdf> accessed 25 January 2019. 
49 DeVito, n 43, 5.  
50 Ioannis Kokkoris, ‘The special nature of banks and its challenges for competition policy’ in François-
Charles Leprévote, Joanna Gray and Francesco de Cecco (ed.), Research Handbook on State Aid in the 
Banking Sector (Edward Elgar, 2017) 12. 
51 Gray and de Cecco, n 45, 32. 
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According to it, the very activities in which a bank primarily engages, meaning the taking 
of short-term, highly liquid and payable on demand deposits and their conversion into 
long-term, illiquid and with set maturity loans, account for a brittle institution, unable 
to navigate and rapidly adapt to unexpected changes in the economy that can 
destabilise depositor faith in the health of the system. This makes banks susceptible to 
runs and panics, which combined with other unfortunate events can easily lead to 
institutions falling short of their capital requirements and being forced into resolution. 
Considering the interconnectedness of the banking system, with most of the loans being 
issued on the interbank market, the interdependence of one institution on the optimal 
or at least smooth operation of another can easily lead to contagion of the ailment. 
Should the issue be allowed to grow large enough, it will lead to the creation of systemic 
instability, crippling the very system on which the function of modern society is based. 
One need to look no further for an example of the consequences such event can have 
than the initial paralysation of the market and wider economy following the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers, the fallout of which remained uncontained and the spillover effect 
palpable to this day in weakened economies across Europe. 
It is easy to see how such destabilisation of the financial system needs to be 
avoided at all cost. The Commission, in fact, aware of the threat to the economy 
employed a “just do it”52 mentality at the initial phases of the crisis when it came to the 
approval of State aid, whilst simultaneously, in need of preserving a semblance of 
competition policy, creating a Temporary Framework for State aid that would allow 
Member States to maximise what they “could squeeze out of the system without 
fundamentally altering it.”53  
5. The	Current	State	Aid	Framework	
This temporary framework for State aid finds application to this day and started 
with the issuance of the 2008 Banking Communication, which set out the general 
principles on which the provision of State aid in the form of government guarantees, 
recapitalisation and liquidity assistance in the form of State or central bank lending was 
                                                        
52 These were the words of Commissioner Neelie Kroes herself. Kroes, n 8, 4. 
53 Kroes, n 8, 4.  
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to be based. The approval of measures had to be non-discriminatory among financial 
institutions and the aid granted could not exceed what was strictly necessary and 
proportionate to achieve its purpose, whilst keeping distortions of competition to the 
minimum.54 All measures had to be well-targeted to achieve the objective of remedying 
a serious disturbance in the economy, proportionate, i.e. limited in time and size, not 
going beyond what is necessary to attain their objective, subject to conditions designed 
to limit distortions of competition in the financial sector, and accompanied by a 
restructuring or liquidation plan.55  
The 2009 Recapitalisation Communication then provided more detailed 
guidelines as to the recapitalisation of banks severely hit by the “credit squeeze” during 
the crisis, as capital injections directly and irreversibly alter the financial structure of the 
recipient institutions and as such are potentially more distortive of competition than 
other forms of aid.56 For this reason, the Communication proceeded to make a 
distinction between fundamentally sound, i.e. well-performing banks in need of 
assistance, and unsound, i.e. distressed, banks, for the recapitalisation of which more 
stringent requirements would apply, such as higher remuneration rates for the capital 
provided, combined with restructuring requirements including changes of management 
and corporate governance.57 
With economic recovery continued to be undermined due to the continuous 
accumulation of “toxic assets” on banks’ balance sheets creating uncertainty over 
possible undisclosed losses, it became necessary to tackle the root causes of the 
financial crisis.58 This was to be accomplished through the issuance of the Impaired Asset 
Communication, which, based on the principles of transparency and disclosure,59 
adequate burden-sharing between the State and institutions, prudent valuation of 
assets based on their real economic value (REV)60 and adequate remuneration of the 
                                                        
54 2008 Banking Communication, 15, 16. 
55 2008 Banking Communication, 14, 15, 29, 35. 
56 DeVito, n 43, 14.  
57 Recapitalisation Communication, 43-45; Damien Gerard, ‘EC Competition Law Enforcement at Grips 
with the Financial Crisis: Flexibility on the Means, Consistency in the Principles‘ [2009]  Institute of 
Competition Law §§24-25. 
58 Iftinchi, n 27, 61. 
59 Impaired Asset Communication, 20(a). 
60 The Communication provides a detailed analysis of the valuation method of the aid granted in Section 
5.5. In footnote 10 to point 20(a) it is established that aid constitutes the difference between the value at 
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State,61 would allow for the provision of asset relief measures62 in line with State aid 
rules.63 This required for government intervention to be “appropriately targeted and 
accompanied by behavioural safeguards that align the incentives of banks with the 
objectives of public policy”64, such as time limits,65 dividend pay-out restrictions and 
executive remuneration caps.66 
In late 2009 the Commission then adopted the Restructuring Communication, 
which complemented the previously issued Communications, and established a 
roadmap of State aid rules to be applied to support financial stability through the return 
of banks to long-term viability.67 It stipulates that institutions in need of restructuring, 
essentially those that have received large amounts of aid and have proven to have 
unsustainable business models, will have to demonstrate strategies with which they will 
be able to achieve long term viability under adverse economic conditions to be assessed 
through rigorous stress-testing.68 Essential to the approval of such restructuring plan is 
the inclusion of extensive burden-sharing provisions69 between the Member State and 
                                                        
which the assets are transferred to the State and their actual market price. The transfer value of the assets 
should be based on their real economic value. Iftinchi (n 27, 62) in particular has argued, that this is as 
banks should not be sheltered against losses which could have had been anticipated at the time of the 
transfer. This consideration should be included in the setting of the transfer price itself. A transfer price 
exceeding the real economic value constitutes an aggravating factor that ought to trigger deeper 
restructuring and the requirement for the difference to be repaid over time. In the cases in which the aid 
takes the form of a guarantee provided for losses above a certain attachment point, the institution is to 
provide a fee to the State for its commitment, and, should any loss exceed the specified attachment point, 
partake in residual loss sharing. This was crucial to incentivise banks to continue to try to minimise their 
losses despite the provided guarantee. 
61 Impaired Asset Communication, 21. 
62 Point 15 of the Impaired Asset Communication specifies that public asset relief measures constitute 
State aid insofar as “they free the beneficiary bank from (or compensate for) the need to register either 
a loss or a reserve for a possible loss on its impaired assets and/or free regulatory capital for other uses.” 
This is the case “were impaired assets are purchased or insured at a value above the market price, or if 
the price of the guarantee does not compensate the State for its possible maximum liability under the 
guarantee.” 
63 Ioannis Kokkoris, Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, ‘Antitrust Policy Amidst Financial Crises‘ (CUP, 2010) ch 6; 
Iftinchi, n 27, 61; Marsden and Kokkoris, n 46, 889. 
64 Impaired Asset Communication, 9. 
65 Impaired Asset Communication, 26, where the limit for participation was set at 6 months. 
66 Impaired Asset Communication, 31. 
67 Marsden and Kokkoris, n 46, 889. 
68 Philip Lowe, State Aid Policy in the context of the financial crisis [2009] 2 Competition Policy Newsletter 
3, 6. 
69 The application of the required burden-sharing, as set by the previous communications and further 
defined through case practice, took on the following main forms:  
For shareholders, the granting of State aid was often contingent on a prohibition of dividend payout 
during the institution’s restructuring in the cases in which their complete write-down was not the norm.* 
Similarly hybrid capital and subordinated debt holders usually faced bans on discretionary coupon 
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the beneficiary bank as well as the limitation of competition distortion by any means 
possible, such as divestments and behavioural constraints.70  
Despite earlier more positive predictions hinting at a stabilisation of the 
situation, the sovereign debt crisis which hit in 2010 uncovered the fact that the fissures 
in the financial system ran deeper than expected and further targeted support of the 
banking system was necessary.71 As such the 2010 Prolongation Communication was 
issued, which extended the application of the Restructuring Communication and Article 
107(3)(b) TFEU, whilst also expanding the requirement of submitting a restructuring 
plan from distressed banks to all institutions benefitting from recapitalisation or IAM. 
The following 2011 Prolongation Communication further prolonged the applicability of 
State aid rules as a response to the ever-worsening sovereign debt crisis, whilst also 
providing further clarifications and explanations as to the methodology applied in 
assessing their applicability.  
Finally, the evolution of the State aid framework reached its climax in 2013 with 
the adoption of the new Banking Communication, which came to replace the 2008 
Banking Communication and to amend and supplement the others, establishing their 
applicability for as long as would be deemed necessary for the achievement of their 
overarching objective of financial stability. With institutions required to adequately plan 
                                                        
payments, which gradually evolved into bans and restrictions on calls or paybacks of these instruments. 
The Commission indeed indicated that it would only allow buybacks of these instruments made at less 
than 90 per cent of the par value and for a market premium that would not exceed 10 per cent.** At the 
same time, indirect burden-sharing methods were being employed through the application of the good 
bank – bad bank approach, such as in the BES/Novo Banco case,*** which led to the creation of a new 
State-recapitalised bank whilst the historic share and subordinated debt holders remained lodged in the 
bad bank, or the selling off of the good assets on a bank’s balance sheet whilst setting the remuneration 
of the State intervention at levels so low that investors would have virtually no chance of recovering their 
investment, as in the Dexia case.**** 
* François-Charles Leprévote, Amélie Campsaur, Hand in hand or parallel paths? Reflections on the future 
coexistence of State aid control and bank resolution in the EU, in François-Charles Leprévote, Joanna Gray 
and Francesco de Cecco (ed.), Research Handbook on State Aid in the Banking Sector (Edward Elgar, 2017) 
538, 557. 
** Explanatory note by staff of the European Commissions DG COMP, Buybacks of Hybrid Securities by 
Banks under Restructuring [2012] 2. 
*** Commission Decision in Case SA.43976 (2015/N) – BES/Novo Banco, 2015, IP/15/6281. 
**** Leprévote and Campsaur, n 69, 538, 558; Commission Decision of 28 December 2012 in Dexia case 
[2014] OJ L110/1, para. 620. 
70 Restructuring Communication, 35 ff. 
71 European Commission, Report on Competition Policy 2010, COM (2011) 328 final, 12. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/2010/part1_en.pdf> accessed 25 January 
2019. 
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for the possibility of shortfalls and the crisis being no longer an unexpected external 
phenomenon taking the market by surprise, rescue aid would no longer be granted on 
an ex ante basis. Instead, in all cases in which the competent supervisor could not 
confirm the urgency of the situation, recapitalisation or IAM would only be granted 
following the submission to and approval by the Commission of a detailed restructuring 
plan.72  
At the same time, with the sovereign debt crisis spreading, more vulnerable 
economies with weaker fiscal positions, such as Cyprus and Spain, started strengthening 
their burden-sharing requirements, requiring the bail-in of senior debt holders, and 
shareholders and junior debt holders respectively, leading to diverging funding costs 
amongst European jurisdictions depending on the perceived likelihood of a bail-in.73 
Trying to combat this trend the Commission provided in the 2013 Banking 
Communication for the raising of the minimum ex ante burden-sharing requirement, 
with the granting of any restructuring aid being dependant on the exhaustion of the 
institution’s own capital generating measures, including the conversion of junior debt 
into equity and its writing down.74 However, whilst the Communication requires the 
write-down or conversion of all equity, hybrid capital and subordinated debt holdings, 
it expressly states that senior debt holders, and in particular insured deposits, uninsured 
deposits, bonds and all other senior debt, will not be required to participate in the 
burden-sharing requirement.75 However, this does not constitute a protection of senior 
debt holders from being bailed-in altogether, but merely sets out the minimum State 
aid requirement.76 Instead, the central principle on the basis of which all write-downs 
or conversions take place is the ‘no creditor worse off’ (NCWO) principle, which ensures 
that no creditor is found after the application of the burden-sharing requirement to be 
worse off than they would have had been had the institution not have had received 
                                                        
72 2013 Banking Communication, 50. 
73 2013 Banking Communication, 18; Iftinchi, n 26, 72. 
74 2013 Banking Communication, 19, 41-44. 
75 2013 Banking Communication, 41-42. 
76 Eurogroup statement on the ESM program for Greece of 14 August 2015 
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/08/14/eurogroup-statement/> 
accessed 25 January 2019; Commission Decision C(2015) 8930 of 4 December 2015 on the Amendment 
of the restructuring plan approved in 2014 and granting of new aid to National Bank of Greece, Case 
SA.43365, 2015. 
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State aid following the required write-down or conversion in the first place.77 In any 
case, the Commission can derogate from the burden-sharing requirement when it finds 
that the application of it would lead to disproportionate results or would endanger 
financial stability. 78  
It should be added, however, that the European State aid framework does not 
constitute a binding framework in its whole. The only binding legal rule in the State aid 
framework is that of Article 107 TFEU. Member States remain free to notify the 
Commission of their plan to provide State aid and can subject their plan to the 
Commission’s judgement even without it meeting the conditions set out in the 
Communications.79 Nevertheless, whilst the Commission’s Communications are non-
binding soft law instruments, they do provide a guide as to the Commission’s 
methodology, certainly taken into consideration in Court proceedings.80  
 
 
 
                                                        
77 2013 Banking Communication, 46. 
78 2013 banking Communication, 45. 
79 Opinion of Advocate General Wahl, Case C-526/14, Kotnik and others, 18 February 2016. 
80 This is considered to be the case when the aid to be received is minimal compared to the bank’s risk 
weighted assets and the bank’s capital shortfall has been reduced significantly through some of the 
imposed capital raising measures. Mara Hellstern, Christian Koenig, ‘The European Commission’s decision-
making on State aid for financial institutions – good regulation in the absence of good governance?’ [2013] 
34(4) ECLR 207, 208. 
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Chapter Two: State Aid Control and Resolution Framework: A Balancing 
Act 
1. The	Rationale	Behind	the	New	Resolution	Framework	
In the absence of an EU wide recovery and resolution framework to tackle the 
outfall of the crisis, it was left to the State aid regime to play the role of saviour to the 
banking system by ensuring adequate State support, allowing for the system to remain 
afloat. However, it wasn’t too long before the consequences of this behaviour became 
noticeable with palpable increases of sovereign debt,81 with UK and Irish finances being 
held as illustrative examples of the impact of bailouts.82 Eventually, the ever increasing 
public deficits became a separate source of concern, with Greece being one of the first 
States whose banks were cut off from the global credit markets, becoming entirely 
reliant on central bank liquidity and exacerbating the already hardly containable issue 
of TBTF83 institutions.84 The result was an emergence of a strong consensus that bail-
outs were no longer sustainable and new systems needed to be put in place that would 
allow for the resolution of banks at no or limited costs to taxpayers and society,85 with 
the costs of bank failures to be borne primarily by the bank’s own shareholders, having 
taken on the counterparty risk of their investment and partaken in the profits.  
The need to create a framework that would allow for such practices outside the 
existing State aid rules was underpinned by the fact that traditional bankruptcy 
procedures had long been considered inadequate to deal with failures of financial 
institutions large enough to be considered systemically important, being too 
                                                        
81 In the period between 2008 and 2014 the euro area general government debt rose by 27 percentage 
points. (European Central Bank, The fiscal impact of financial sector support during the crisis, ECB 
Economic Bulletin, Issue 6/2015, 74.) 
82 Chstistos Hadjiemmanuil, Limits on the state-funded bailouts in the EU bank resolution regime, [2017] 
2 EBI Working Paper Series, 3; Emilios Avgouleas, Charles Goodhard, Critical reflections on Bank Bail-ins, 
[2015] 1:1 Journal of Financial Regulation, 3, 4.  
83 Such are the institutions which are so large and interconnected to such degree that the failure of one 
would inevitably bring about the failure of others, crippling or severely impacting the greater economic 
system, and thus forcing government intervention for their rescue.  
84 Iftinchi, n 26, 68. 
85 T. F. Huertas, The Road to Better Resolution: From Bail-Out to Bail-In, [2010] LSE Financial Markets 
Group Paper Series, Special Paper No 195; Peter Benczur, Giuseppina Cannas, Jessica Cariboni, Francesca 
Di Girolamo, Sara Maccaferri, Marco Petracco Giudici, Evaluating the effectiveness of the new EU bank 
regulatory framework: A farewell to bail-out?, [2017] 33 Journal of Financial Stability, 207. 
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complicated and time consuming to be applied to failing banks86 and unable to secure 
the continuation of banks’ critical functions, such as payment services and lending 
activities.87 Additionally, increasing support for the belief that bankruptcy intervention 
leads to further erosion of the already dwindling financial institution’s value by turning 
the institution from a going to a gone concern, exacerbating the losses for the creditors 
at an already crucial time,88 further undermined market confidence, increasing the 
chance of destabilisation of the financial system,89 and contributing to Member States 
deciding to bail out their institutions. 
However, the possibly most important reason for the decisive support of a new 
resolution framework for financial institutions was the issue of moral hazard. The 
continued approach of Member States to provide emergency financing to their banking 
system to stave off the worst of the crisis, despite more and more extensive State aid 
rules establishing burden-sharing requirements over time, placated the banks and 
stimulated their risk-taking behaviour. Especially when it comes to systemically 
important institutions, what could be perceived from investors as eagerness on the 
Member States’ side to protect the stability of their economy at any cost to their own 
balance sheet, created the anticipation that investment in these institutions was not 
only safe,90 but also guaranteed, encouraging further risk-taking behaviour and the 
continuation of harmful practices.  
2. Bail-in	under	the	Bank	Recovery	and	Resolution	Directive	
With these considerations in mind the Commission eventually proposed the 
introduction of a common rulebook to deal with failing banks, which led to the adoption 
                                                        
86 Wolf-Georg Ringe, Bail-in between Liquidity and Solvency [2017] University of Oxford Legal Research 
Paper Series, Paper No 33/2016, 5. 
87 Marco Bodellini, To Bail-In, or to Bail-Out, that is the Question, [2018] 19 European Business 
Organisation Law Review 365, 368. 
88 RD Guynn, Are bailouts inevitable? [2012] 29 Yale Journal on Regulation 121, 137-140. 
89 Ringe, n 86, referencing Gary Gorton, Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, [2010] 
41 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 261; Andrei Schleifer, Robert Vishny, Fire Sales in Finance and 
Macroeconomics, [2011] 25(1) Journal of Economic Perspectives, 29. 
90 David Goldberg, Investor Moral Hazard and ECB Monetary Policy Response [2015] 17 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=3014179> accessed 25 January 2019. 
  -21- 
of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive in 2014.91 Its flagship bail-in provisions 
aim at preventing moral hazard by making the bail-out of banks not only virtually 
impossible, but also, in the rare circumstances in which such may be granted,92 
contingent on the extensive bail-in of shareholders and creditors in order of their 
priority claims under normal insolvency proceedings.93 According to the BRRD, when 
faced with ailing institutions, be they failing or likely to fail, the resolution authorities 
will have to examine whether the fallout from the institution’s failure would be great 
enough to generate financial instability, as for its resolution to be in the public interest.94 
Furthermore, the authority will have to establish that there is no reasonable prospect 
that any alternative private sector measure or supervisory action would prevent the 
failure of the institution within a reasonable timeframe.95 Only should this be the case 
is the application of resolution tools to follow,96 provided that the institution is 
effectively resolvable.97 The authority can then, having first completed the write-down 
or conversion of capital instruments under Article 59 BRRD, and pursuant to the NCWO 
principle,98 employ the bail-in tool. It should be noted, though, that Article 44(2) BRRD 
specifically excludes covered deposits, secured, collateralised, guaranteed and other 
expressly mentioned liabilities from the tool’s scope of application. 
                                                        
91 For reasons of accuracy it should be noted that whilst the BRRD harmonises the different mechanisms 
used by Member States to intervene in failing banks, it is the Single Resolution Mechanism which sets out 
the institutional and funding architecture for the rules included in the directive. 
92 See Chapter 2, Section 3. 
93 Stefano Micossi, Ginevra Bruzzone, Miriam Cassella, State aid, bail-in, and systemic financial stability in 
the EU (VOX CEPR Policy Portal, 06 June 2016) <https://voxeu.org/article/state-aid-bail-and-systemic-
financial-stability-eu>, accessed 25 January 2019. 
94 BRRD, Article 32(1). 
95 BRRD, Recital 49. 
96 Ibid. The resolution tools as set out in the BRRD are: the sale of business tool (Chapter IV, Section 2 
BRRD), the bridge institution tool (Chapter IV, Section 3 BRRD), the asset separation tool (Chapter IV, 
Section 4 BRRD) and the bail-in tool (Chapter IV, Section 5 BRRD). 
97 BRRD, Recital 49; BRRD Article 15(1). 
98 This principle applies to all resolution tools according to Article 34(1)(g) BRRD and is enshrined in Articles 
73 to 75 BRRD. For the application of the principle to the bail-in tool in particular see Article 73(b). 
According to Article 74 BRRD the assessment of whether the NCWO principle is being adhered to is to 
take place by an independent valuer. The valuer is to determine that there is no difference between the 
treatment of shareholders and creditors that they did receive under the resolution proceedings and which 
they would have received if the institution had entered into normal insolvency proceedings under the 
national law of the institution instead. The European Banking Authority (EBA) has provided further 
clarifications to the application of the Article in its Single Rulebook Q&A. See for example 
<https://eba.europa.eu/single-rule-book-qa/-/qna/view/publicId/2015_2181> and 
<https://eba.europa.eu/single-rule-book-qa/-/qna/view/publicId/2015_2458>.   
  -22- 
The application of the bail-in tool does not come without its own drawbacks, 
though. Despite being considered an adequate measure to limit moral hazard and public 
burden, it is uncontested that its retroactive application and interference with investor 
property rights raises issues of greater extent than the burden-sharing requirement of 
the State aid framework, with the BRRD provisions not falling into the ambit of soft law 
like the Crisis Communications do. And whilst the retroactivity issue, i.e. the provisions 
regarding bail-in applying to equity and debt instruments issued before the introduction 
of the BRRD into the regulatory system,99 can be more easily explained away, at the very 
least by considering it an extension of the regulatory risk the investor undertakes as part 
of their counterparty risk, the interference with property rights is more difficult to 
justify. In this regard, the principle established by Kotnik100 in light of the burden-sharing 
requirement of the 2013 Banking Communication is crucial. With the right to property 
recognised under Article 17 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, any restriction to 
it will have to correspond to the objective of securing public interest and the measures 
will have to be proportionate to the aim pursued. In this sense, “the objective of 
ensuring the stability of the financial system while avoiding excessive public spending 
and minimising distortions of competition does constitute an objective of public interest 
which may justify certain restrictions of the right to property”.101 Furthermore, by 
adhering to the NCWO principle, bail-in merely reduces “the nominal value of the equity 
and debt instruments affected, because that value no longer corresponds to their real 
value”.102 As such, from an economic point of view, the position of investors, whether 
there is an application of bail-in or not, should remain the same, considering that even 
in the worst case scenario of their stake being completely written-off, they would be no 
worse off than they would have had been had the State not intervened.103 In the case 
of the BRRD’s bail-in tool, however, it remains at the hands of the resolution authorities 
to decide whether and at which point a proportional compromise between the 
conflicting legitimate interests of property and financial stability can be reached.104 
                                                        
99 Bodellini, n 87, 374. 
100 ECJ Case C-526/14 Tadej Kotnik and Others v Državni zbor Republike Slovenije [2016] 
101 Wahl, n 79, 88. 
102 Ibid 87. 
103 Ibid 90. 
104 Bodellini, n 87, 375. 
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In any case, when it comes to its application as a recovery tool bail-in can be 
regarded as a reorganisation procedure, as it aims to keep the vital parts of institutions 
alive and running, yet their debts markedly restructured.105 As such, bail-in is 
conceptually opposite to the primarily employed bail-out, as the losses of financial 
institutions are expected to not be put on taxpayer’s shoulders, but instead, be carried 
by shareholders and creditors. In this sense, there is no discrepancy between the bail-in 
tool and the 2013 Banking Communication’s burden-sharing requirement. There are 
differences, however, as to the scope of liabilities covered under the BRRD. Contrary to 
the State aid framework, the BRRD allows for the write-down not only of shareholders 
and subordinated debt, but also of senior debt that isn’t otherwise exempted from its 
application, providing for a to a large extent similar and yet under circumstances 
different parallel application106 of the frameworks which operate in tandem.107 
3. Bail-out	 Measures	 in	 the	 Bank	 Recovery	 and	 Resolution	
Directive	
However, the granting of extraordinary financial assistance to institutions in 
distress is not completely ruled out under the BRRD either. Whilst the initial reduction 
of a bank’s liabilities through the bail-in of its shareholders and creditors may allow for 
the equalisation of the negative difference between the value of the debts of the 
institution and the value of its assets,108 such erosion may not always be enough in cases 
of significant bank crises or systemic crises, something the BRRD itself recognises and 
accounts for.  
In fact, the BRRD requires Member States to set up resolution financing 
arrangements, known as resolution funds, which can be used for the purposes provided 
for in the directive, including liquidity assistance, recapitalisation and loss absorbance, 
however, only to the extent necessary to ensure the effective application of the 
resolution tools and without it being used to directly absorb any of the losses of the 
                                                        
105 Ringe, n 86, 8. 
106 For a detailed discussion of the relationship between the State aid framework and the BRRD see 
Chapter 2, Section 4(a). 
107 Christos Hadjiemmanuil, Limits on State-Funded Bailouts in the EU Bank Resolution Regime, [2016] 
European Economy, 2016.2, 91, 95. 
108 Bodellini, n 87, 371. 
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institution.109 Should such loss absorption by the fund occur nevertheless, then it must 
be limited to less than 5% of the total liabilities of the institution including own funds, 
and can only occur following the write-down or conversion of an amount equal to no 
less than 8% of its total liabilities.110 The use of the fund in such cases constitutes State 
aid in the sense of Art 107(1) TFEU, as, while the scheme is funded with funds collected 
from the private sector, the use of these funds is imputable to the State.111 Having said 
that, considering the amount of losses and the amount of bail-in exempted liabilities in 
each individual case, it follows that the role of the resolution fund as a backstop in 
resolution procedures might be limited, especially considering that Article 102 BRRD 
states that the contribution to the fund should equal 1% of the total covered deposits 
of all institutions authorised by 2024, which, despite the fund being able to borrow on 
capital markets to augment its capacity,112 is likely to prove insufficient in case of a 
resolution of a systemically important institution or should multiple banks require to be 
resolved simultaneously.113 Ringe has argued that in these cases the ECB should be 
tasked with providing the necessary liquidity to the institutions in line with its function 
as lender of last resort, or should this prove politically unfeasible, the European Stability 
Mechanism should take on the role of a backstop.114 However, for the time being, it 
appears that the only viable and immediate solution remains the application of the State 
aid framework.115 
As such, whilst the objective of the BRRD is to reduce the need for State rescues 
of systemic banks to the greatest extent possible,116 the directive itself recognises the 
possibility that the use of State intervention might be nevertheless necessary. It 
therefore provides for the possibility of the application of Government Financial 
Stabilisation Tools (GFSTs).117 The access to them is contingent on the institution being 
                                                        
109 BRRD, Article 101. 
110 BRRD Article 101(2), 44(5). 
111 2013 Banking Communication, 63, 64. 
112 Ringe, n 86, 36. 
113 Bodellini, n 87, 380. 
114 For a more detailed analysis of the argument see Ringe, n 86, 38.   
115 This can be concluded from BRRD Recital 55 according to which the use of resolution funds is to be 
compliant with the relevant State aid provisions. 
116 BRRD, Recital 1. 
117 BRRD, Article 56; GFSTs can take on the form of the public equity support tool (Article 57 BRRD) or the 
temporary public ownership tool (Article 58 BRRD). 
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undercapitalised, despite the prior exhaustion of all resolution tools to the maximum 
degree possible,118 and the institution’s continuation as a going concern being 
imperative for reasons of systemic stability.119 And whilst it is not necessary for a bank 
to be insolvent or even illiquid in order to be the recipient of State financial support, the 
need for State support has been turned into a trigger for a bank’s placement into 
resolution or liquidation.120 As such the use of GFSTs, upon the resolution authority’s 
decision that the application of resolution tools alone is insufficient to avoid a significant 
adverse effect on the financial system or would not suffice to protect public interest,121  
places the institution into resolution. With extraordinary public financial support 
constituting State aid, the application of GFSTs is contingent not only on a prior 
minimum loss absorption of 8% of total liabilities including own funds by shareholders 
and creditors having taken place, but also on prior approval of the Commission under 
State Aid rules.122 As such, GFSTs form part of the resolution process, being a last-resort 
alternative financing source for the implementation of the resolution tools selected.123 
It would be misleading, however, to claim that all forms of bailout granted under 
the BRRD lead to the automatic placing of the institution into resolution. In fact, the 
BRRD contains three express exceptions establishing that the provision of “State 
guarantee[s] to back liquidity facilities by central banks, [...] State guarantee[s] of newly 
issued liabilities, and [...] injections of own funds or purchase of capital instruments at 
prices and on terms that do not confer an advantage upon the credit institution,”124 
when necessary in order to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member 
State and preserve financial stability, will not lead to the characterisation of a bank as 
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failing or likely to fail, keeping it as such outside the scope of resolution.125 This requires 
that any support granted is approved by the Commission by being in line with the State 
aid framework, is confined to solvent institutions,126 is of precautionary and temporary 
nature, is proportionate to the consequences of the economic disturbance, and is not 
used to offset losses that the recipient institution has already incurred or is likely to incur 
in the near future.127 Especially in the case of the so dubbed ‘precautionary 
recapitalisation’ tool,128 two further requirements are to be met: The support must be 
extended at prices and at terms that do not confer an advantage upon the institution, 
and be limited to injections necessary to address capital shortfalls identified based on 
stress tests, asset quality reviews or equivalent exercises conducted by the ECB, the EBA 
or national authorities.129 In this sense, it is understood that any aid granted to 
institutions under the precautionary recapitalisation exception, should not exceed the 
amount necessary to boost the bank’s capital ratio to a point where it can withstand an 
‘unlikely’ as opposed to a ‘base’ case stress scenario, as that would go against the 
principle of the institution having to bear its own losses expected to be incurred.130  
4. Discussion	
Whilst the extensive requirements for the application of the precautionary 
recapitalisation tool make the access to this ‘escape clause’ difficult, it is all in all obvious 
that the BRRD contains numerous ambiguous provisions conferring discretion to the 
resolution authorities with regard to not only the determination of the point of failure 
of an institution, but also the allocation of the resolution costs.131 In fact, since the 
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coming into force of the BRRD, this ambiguity, paired with the parallel application of the 
State aid framework and the BRRD, has given rise to questions as to their interaction, 
with it being not always clear which of the two frameworks will take precedence and 
whether a more stringent or lenient approach towards the limitations of State funded 
bail-out is to be taken in interpreting the therewith associated in theory very rigid 
provisions.  
 
a. State	Aid	and	the	BRRD	
In this regard, the different objectives of the frameworks at large need to be 
considered. Whilst the resolution framework, as shaped by the BRRD, asserts on 
multiple occasions its dedication to limiting the crisis’ impact on the public purse and 
the ending the issue of TBTF, it remains but an instrument of primarily financial 
regulation. State aid control, on the other hand, is primarily a competition tool, 
ultimately aiming at enhancing consumer welfare.  
Theoretically, given its importance for the European integration project, 
competition policy is expected to take priority over conduct capable of harming 
competition in the system.132 Meanwhile, unsurprisingly, the systemic nature of bank 
failure favours an approach which relegates competition policy altogether.133 In fact it 
has been claimed that in the banking sector in particular, concentrated markets are safer 
in terms of financial stability,134 as systemic crises are less likely to occur in concentrated 
banking sectors due to fewer regulatory restrictions being associated with less systemic 
fragility,135 since with market power associated monopoly rents can constitute a buffer 
against adverse shocks, making institutions less likely to take excessive risks due to the 
opportunity cost of failure.136  
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If anything, however, the events of the recent financial crisis have painted a 
much different picture, first promulgating and then cementing the view that the loss of 
competitive rivalry as such was not significant in the overall tackling of the crisis.137 In 
fact, most governments were forced to intervene in their markets to support their 
banking industry exactly because of the extent to which the market was ‘oligopolised’, 
with few interventions ending up being disciplined under competition policy 
considerations altogether, despite the European Union’s extensive State aid control 
provisions developing at the time.138 This is the case as in concentrated markets the 
failure of any single bank can have much more significant consequences139 on the 
system and the banks operating in it as a whole. After all, the extensive 
interconnectedness and interdependence of institutions means that any possible 
unravelling’s effects on the system’s health makes it oftentimes more favourable for a 
bank to have a State aided competitor than to have to face the outfall of the 
competitor’s crumbling with all that it can entail for the institution’s own stability.  
Yet, it remains uncontested that any such government intervention has 
distortive effects on competition by enabling inefficient banks to remain operational, 
under circumstances even prolonging the crisis by allowing the preservation of unfit 
institutions.140 And whilst competition policy generally ought to be kept separate from 
policies relating to considerations of the TBTF doctrine, it is evident from the overall 
build-up of the regulatory frameworks adopted during and following the crisis and the 
State aid application loopholes included therein, that in periods of crises competition 
policy might have to be lenient towards State aid measures which sustain such banks, 
due to the necessity to remain pragmatic during times of enormous economic 
turmoil.141 After all, the 2013 Banking Communication promotes financial stability as the 
overarching objective pursued by its adoption. And yet differentiations in the overall 
approach can be seen depending on the phase of the economic cycle of the institution 
and economy as a whole. State aid control will be generally given priority over resolution 
schemes prior to crises, whereas financial stability is likely to be the focal point during, 
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as shown by the tendency to rapidly approve resolution schemes involving State aid on 
the basis of quick assessments.142 This approach is then reversed again in periods 
following crises when the adverse effects of State aid become palpable, reinvigorating 
the competition policy objective.143 
b. Bail-in	vs	Bail-out	
This can be also felt throughout the approach taken to the application of bail-in 
as opposed to bail-out since the adoption of the directive.  
Despite bail-in being the flagship provision of the BRRD, the directive itself 
addresses the fact that it does not constitute a sort of panacea, recognising that the 
restructuring of an individual insolvent bank and the prevention of the knock-on effect 
of an outright failure is not the only form of contagion authorities should be worried 
about. In fact, it has been argued that the direct transmission of losses to the taxpayer 
can be the lesser evil when compared to the certainty of bail-in being applied in the 
wake of resolution.144 In a weak environment and in a context of widespread distress, 
the indiscriminate application of bail-in with regard to one bank might very well lead 
other banks’ claimholders to reappraise their position, precipitating an across-the-board 
flight-to-quality.145 This in turn can result in an increase of the cost of refinancing at a 
point in time when the access to the markets is of imperative importance for the banking 
sector, with the whole of it striving to raise additional funds to weather the storm 
through the issuance of equity or debt instruments.146 Additionally, the application of 
the bail-in tool can generate the same consequences as the resolution aims to avoid in 
the first place, namely that of financial instability, as by writing down banks’ liabilities 
any solvency issues are merely transferred to their creditors, which are usually other 
financial institutions.147 This results in the tool acting as an accelerator of contagion 
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capable of generating a domino effect.148 And whilst the raising of capital adequacy 
requirements149 in the wake of the crisis was an important development in the sector, 
aiming at staving off the worst of such an effect, it would be imprudent to consider such 
prudential regulation enough to be able to exclude the necessity to resort to public 
funding altogether, with any amount of slowly being raised or increased minimum 
capital requirement or buffer nevertheless susceptible to bank runs, contagion and 
unexpected losses. Perhaps for this reason the BRRD makes access to extraordinary 
public assistance, whilst not the norm, nevertheless possible.150  
However, even in cases of access to public finance, the automatic disapplication 
of the bail-in provision in particular, or even the circumvention of the burden-sharing 
requirement altogether is not possible. Instead, while the application of ‘bail-in’ as such 
can be circumvented through the exemption of certain liabilities from the requirement 
to be bailed-in151 based on the resolution authority’s judgement that the application of 
the tool to such would generate financial instability,152 any such exemption requires an 
alternative corresponding amount from alternate sources to be raised in order to 
adequately recapitalise the ailing bank.153 These in turn will take the forms analysed 
above,154 namely external financing arrangements in the form of resolution funds, or 
alternatively, and in only the most severe of situations, the form of GFSTs. 
However, in the cases in which the application of the bail-in tool is already found 
to be inappropriate due to the increased risks the writing down of shareholder or 
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debtholder claims would bring with it, the use of a resolution fund is also in effect 
excluded.155 This is the case as under Article 44(5) BRRD contribution by the 
arrangement is only possible in the cases in which an initial “contribution to loss 
absorption and recapitalisation equal to an amount of not less than 8% of the total 
liabilities including own funds of the institution [has taken place] through write down, 
conversion, or otherwise”. However, with bail-in excluded for reasons of systemic 
stability, a write down of the sort which would allow for the use of the fund would also 
not be possible.156 The same fate also meets the GFSTs aiming at transferring the holding 
in the resolved institutions to the private sector as soon as commercial and financial 
conditions allow for it.157 Both, the public equity support tool and the temporary public 
ownership tool, require the prior bail-in of shareholders and creditors equal to at least 
8% of total liabilities,158 making these tools as well not utilisable in cases in which bail-in 
as such has been found to be the problem. 
What remains in these cases is the application of the precautionary 
recapitalisation tool, which, as analysed above,159 allows for the injection of the State’s 
own funds into the institution where the conditions for its application are met.160 
Despite it constituting the purest form of bail-out, it has been argued that it does not 
lead to an increase of moral hazard. This is the case as the main requirement for the 
tool’s application is the existence of a serious disturbance in the economy making public 
assistance necessary. Especially in the cases in which an institution’s troubles are mostly 
due to contagion, coupled with the market having dried up and interest rates reaching 
a prohibitive level, this primarily constitutes an exogenous event beyond banks’ control 
and, therefore, would have little impact on moral hazard.161 Additionally, the existence 
of a serious disturbance in the economy might hint at the fragility of the sector as a 
whole.162 Should a bank go insolvent, this would make the system more prone to a 
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systemic crisis, thus making the prevention of the unfolding of such events even through 
public intervention, all the more important.163   
Even more so, it should be noted that the English version the BRRD when it 
comes to the application of the precautionary recapitalisation tool only refers to the 
employment of the tool “in order to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a 
Member State,”164 whilst in other versions mention is also made to its application in 
order to ‘avoid’ such.165 The distinction is significant as it allows for pre-emptive public 
intervention even outside a general crisis scenario, when it is deemed that the potential 
distress of a particular bank, be it for internal or other reasons, could have serious 
repercussions for the economy as a whole.166 And this is crucial, as despite the emphasis 
on the importance of preserving financial stability and preventing any serious 
disturbance to the economy of a Member State throughout the BRRD, a definition of 
when this requirement is fulfilled is not to be found anywhere in the text of the directive 
itself. Instead, the Commission has merely acknowledged that the financial crisis had 
created the conditions of such disturbance, hinting that stress in financial markets, 
contraction in the real economy and wider negative spillover effects are all components 
of such a disturbance.167  
In any case, absent of any quantitative or qualitative indications of how any such 
delimitation is to take place, the inclusion of this ambiguity and in essence flexibility will 
have to be ascribed as being part of the desired discretionary flexibility granted to the 
authorities to exercise an exceptional deviation from the general policy agenda of not 
using government funds when deemed absolutely necessary.168 This is further 
underlined by the fact that the 2013 Banking Communication, whilst stressing that its 
main goal in the State aid authorisation process is to ensure financial stability, grants the 
Commission the power to exclude the application of the burden-sharing requirement 
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altogether when this “would endanger financial stability or lead to disproportionate 
results”.169  
As such, at the end of the day, it is obvious that the Commission has relatively 
wide discretionary powers when it comes to the decision of whether to apply bail-in or 
bail-out when faced with a particular bank’s individual situation, assuming the minimum 
requirements for the application of each tool are met, in the sense that it is the 
Commission that undertakes the final assessment of when and whether the conditions 
allowing for the derogation from the bail-in requirement are met. This is underlined by 
the fact that since its coming into force in 2016 the bail-in tool hasn’t actually found 
application in a single resolution process.  
And whilst it can certainly be recognised that this breathing room is important in 
cases of extreme economic circumstances, the choice of the application of this 
discretion when it comes to recent cases can seem a bit arbitrary. The precautionary 
recapitalisation tool has found application twice in the Greek banking sector, with 
Piraeus Bank and the National Bank of Greece both having failed the 2015 
Comprehensive Assessment in the baseline and adverse scenario, thus requiring their 
recapitalisation by the HFSF, first as a backstop to facilitate private subscriptions of 
capital and then as an underwriter providing the missing resources.170 Both transactions 
were carried out entirely according to the burden-sharing principle laid down in the 
2013 Banking Communication.171 In the Italian banking sector, on the other hand, Monte 
dei Paschi di Siena, Banca Popolare di Vicenza, and Veneto Banca all failed stress tests, 
ending up having to be recapitalised roughly at the same time.172 It was recognised by 
the authority that the simultaneous submission to resolution of the banks could 
generate instability that would not remain contained at national level, should significant 
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amounts of liabilities be bailed-in.173 Whilst the banks were already issuing bonds with 
State guarantees on the basis of being considered solvent by the supervisor, the ECB 
determined that the latter two were failing due to repeated breaches of the supervisory 
capital requirements, resulting in the application of the precautionary recapitalisation 
tool being out of the question.174 Instead, they were submitted to winding-up 
procedures under Italian law due to lack of public interest for their resolution as 
determined by the Single Resolution Board, whilst the Commission nevertheless 
approved State aid measures to facilitate their liquidation. This implies sufficient 
existence of public interest to warrant the use of public money after all. The existence 
of this discrepancy in approaches solidifies the position and power of the Commission 
as gatekeeper. 
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Chapter Three: The Non Performing Loans Issue and the Stance of State 
Aid Control 
Whilst the above discussion might seem tedious and extended it is nothing but 
relevant when it comes to the issue of tackling the NPLs which have been plaguing the 
European Banking System since its inception, and the dealing with which has even been 
identified as one of the main areas of action by the Council of the EU in its July 2017 
Action plan175 and as one of the key initiatives needed for completing the Banking 
Union.176 In fact, the burden-sharing versus bailout debate lies at the heart of the 
discussion surrounding NPLs as well. 
1. The	Issue	of	Non	Performing	Loans	
It is uncontested that the resolution of NPLs, that have accumulated enough for 
them to create an issue of systemic proportions, is complex and costly.177 With NPLs 
problems tending to emerge after credit booms or protracted periods of low growth in 
structurally weak financial systems, their tendency to crowd out new lending, and, thus, 
their further eroding of the profitability and the solvency of banks, poses an important 
problem to the overall health of the financial system.178 Coupled with the sheer number 
of NPLs in certain jurisdictions, the issue is more than capable of threatening financial 
stability.  
Additionally, NPLs disproportionately affect weaker economies, which already 
suffer from slower growth and more expensive funding costs. This makes it all the more 
difficult for the issue to be tackled, especially when faced with the more often than not 
over-strained and slow judicial systems tasked with dealing with creditor claims and 
insolvency, making their resolution not only costly but also time-consuming, and 
exacerbating the issue of their accumulation. These prolonged judicial procedures when 
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combined with weak enforcement and collateral repossession frameworks lead to 
reductions in the economic value of the recoverable net cash flows,179 and as such 
further increase the negative effect the impaired assets have on banks’ balance sheets.  
And whilst there has been a noticeable drop in the amount of NPL throughout 
the EU following their rapid growth during the crisis and peak in 2016, the recovery is 
still slower than that of other major developed nations,180 with certain most affected 
countries, such as Greece and Cyprus, still struggling to tackle their overhang, despite 
improved post-crisis macroeconomic conditions and more decisive authority 
interventions.181 In fact, the recognition of the size of the problem and the discovery of 
capital shortfalls due to under-provisioning have been crucial in forming the current 
approach to micro- and macroprudential regulation and supervision, with the EU 
adopting the mindset that the tackling of what is considered an idiosyncratic legacy 
problem at national level, whilst at the same time adhering to the State aid rules and 
the ‘no-bail-out paradigm’ stated by the BRRD, is imperative to the completion of the 
Banking Union.182  
In its 2017 Action Plan on Non-Performing Loans, in particular, the Council 
stressed the main policy areas in which reform is needed, focusing on supervision, 
structural reforms of insolvency and debt recovery frameworks, the further 
development of secondary markets for distressed assets, and the fostering of 
restructuring of the banking system.183 Amongst a strong wave of reforms184 the 
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European Commission then issued its NPL package.185 Consisting of a Regulation 
amendment to introduce common minimum coverage levels for new NPLs, a proposed 
Directive on the activities of credit services, including proposals that will enable 
accelerated out-of-court enforcement of company loans secured by collateral to further 
develop a secondary market for NPLs, and a non-binding blueprint on setting up national 
AMCs, it is considered to be a crucial step in the tackling of the NPLs issue and the 
completing of the Banking Union, whilst also providing for the easing in of northern 
Member States which have been strongly opposed to the possible mutualisation of said 
legacy costs so far. However, with the new regime only applying to loans that have 
originated after March 14th 2018, it is the set up and use of AMCs with or without public 
support that is likely to make the biggest difference in alleviating the already existing 
NPLs burden. Their use as a ‘bridge’ tool will not only allow for the immediate alleviation 
of the bank’s balance sheet and the reduction of the uncertainty surrounding its 
profitability and solvency, but also bridge the “inter-temporal pricing gap”186 of NPLs 
and their underlying collateral through working them out over a set period of time to 
maximise recovery value.187 
2. The	National	Asset	Management	Company	Blueprint188	
In principle, there are multiple ways for banks to deal with existing NPLs, such as 
by restructuring them, enforcing collateral, or even selling them in the secondary 
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market, all of which do not require State intervention.189 However, in certain cases, and 
especially during and in the aftermath of the crisis, several Member States deemed 
public intervention necessary to handle the unprecedented problem of impaired assets, 
given that due to the overall market turbulence and uncertainty surrounding their value, 
public support was often found to be the only thing that stood between the banks’ 
continuation as a going concern and unorderly demise.190 
As with any other State intervention for the purposes of safeguarding 
competition and the internal market full compliance with State aid rules is required. 
However, the evolution of the EU post-crisis reforms has made access to public funding 
difficult and subject to extensive constraints. In the case of NPLs in fact, the access to 
the precautionary recapitalisation tool is even more limited, as the extensive criteria for 
its activation leave very slim margins for its application. Not only is it possible to consider 
shortages brought on by NPLs as “losses likely to incur in the near future” or under 
circumstances even as losses which already have incurred, but, in order for the 
application of the provision to be even considered, the institution itself and the financial 
system in general must already find themselves in such a grave state that would allow 
for the triggering of the requirement of the aid needing to be granted “in order to 
remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State and preserve financial 
stability”, whilst at the same time any aid granted will only be capable of taking on the 
form of an injection of own funds or purchase of capital instruments at realistic asset 
prices.191 On this hinges the issue of NPLs, as, considering the overall fragile condition of 
the economy in the Member States in which they have accumulated (e.g. Greece), there 
inevitably is a need for subsidisation given the sheer amount of them in certain 
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jurisdictions,192  whilst at the same time the separation and absorption of such assets is 
envisaged exclusively within the resolution framework.193  
Faced with these problems the Italian Government was one of the first to 
encourage the formation of an AMC, Atlante, a private-sector backstop fund without 
fiscal support that would allow for the private sector bail-out of banks and purchase of 
NPL portfolios.194 It is in a similar vein, that the Commission developed the Blueprint for 
National Asset Management Companies that will allow the removal of troubled assets 
from bank’s balance sheets and thereby the reduction of the high uncertainty about the 
quality of the bank’s assets in a way that is compatible with the BRRD and preferably 
without triggering the application of the State aid framework, thereby accelerating the 
restructuring of banks with high levels of distressed assets, stabilising the national 
banking sectors and eliminating a significant impediment to the flow of new credit to 
the economy.195  
The objective of the AMC Blueprint is the provision of practical guidance and 
recommendations for Member States when considering the design and set-up of 
centralised AMCs at national level to tackle NPLs. In this regard it builds upon best 
practices from past experiences, putting forward a number of non-binding principles, 
such as relevant asset perimeters, the participation perimeter, the appropriate capital 
                                                        
192 In the third quarter of 2018 the weighted average of NPLs stood at 39% in Greece and at 12% in 
Portugal. In Cyprus in the preceding quarter it stood at 34%. Whilst the ratio in Italy now lies below 10%, 
this still amounts to the largest NPLs exposure in the Eurozone in absolute terms.  
European Banking Authority, Risk Dashboard Data as of Q2 2018 [08.10.2018] 
<https://eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/2385362/EBA+Dashboard+-+Q2+2018.pdf> accessed 25 
January 2019; European Banking Authority, Risk Dashboard Data as of Q3 2018 [08.01.2019] 
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January 2019. 
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of the State for its provision is also at market terms. With the risk exposure being analogous to what a 
private market operator would undertake under market conditions, the guarantee does not trigger the 
application of State aid rules. [European Commission – Press Release, State aid: Commission approves 
impaired asset management measures for banks in Hungray and Italy, IP/16/279 (10 February 2016) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-279_en.htm> accessed 25 January 2019.]  
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structure, access to funding, and the governance and operation of the AMC, all with the 
goal of ensuring the smooth reduction of NPLs in compliance with EU rules.196  
For this purpose, the Blueprint promotes primarily the setting up of AMCs that 
are privately funded. The participation of the State in the funding is permissible to the 
extent to which it takes place within the limits set by the MEIP.197 In any other case the 
AMC will be considered to have been set up with State aid and, as such, be subject to all 
applicable rules of the BRRD and State aid framework. Nevertheless, the setting up of 
such State-funded AMCs is not precluded. In fact, the Blueprint provides for and clarifies 
their permissible design, recognising the fact that under circumstances private funding 
may either not be available altogether or simply not enough in order to secure and allow 
for the AMC’s operation without access to additional State funding.  
However, it is recognised that an AMC if poorly designed or managed can also 
contribute to financial instability, including in the cases of publicly supported or 
guaranteed vehicles, potentially leading to the reinforcement of the sovereign doom 
loop, which can lead to the breaking of the link of private losses and public finances as 
enshrined in the BRRD.198 For this reason, State backed AMCs cannot under any 
circumstances be considered as panacea and the faithful adherence to the State aid and 
BRRD framework applicable to their operation is crucial. In this regard the Blueprint 
specifies that where impaired asset relief is granted in the context of a transfer of NPLs 
to a publicly-supported AMC this constitutes extraordinary public financial support as 
defined in the BRRD, with the result that a bank benefitting from it will have to be 
resolved or liquidated, and any impaired asset aid granted will have to comply with the 
general requirements applicable to restructuring aid, i.e. be capable of restoring the 
bank’s long-term viability, limited to the minimum necessary through burden-sharing 
and own contribution, and limiting distortions of competition, as set out in the State aid 
framework and analysed in previous sections.199 
In particular, the Blueprint recognises four distinct scenarios of transfers of NPLs 
from a bank to a publicly supported AMC. However, not all of them lead to the automatic 
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application of the State aid framework per se. In fact, the first, and preferred scenario, 
exempts the AMC from the application of the State aid rules altogether, as through the 
pursuance to the MEIP, the only economic advantage provided to the ailing bank is the 
reduction of its liabilities.200 The second scenario, on the other hand, refers to the case 
in which an AMC is set up in the context of a resolution of a bank, as the use of the asset 
separation tool of the BRRD requires.201 In these cases State aid can come in the form of 
fund aid as provided by the Single Resolution Fund or State aid provided by national 
resolution funds. An AMC can, furthermore, also be set up in light of insolvency 
proceedings of a bank under national law.202 This would allow for the good assets of the 
bank being liquidated to be pooled together and sold hopefully at better terms than in 
the case of strict liquidation procedures absent an AMC. In fact, such liquidation aid can 
be considered compatible with the internal market when it facilitates the exit of non-
viable players in an orderly manner that does not endanger financial stability.203  
Possibly most importantly, however, the Blueprint also foresees the possibility of an 
AMC profiting from the precautionary recapitalisation tool. And, especially in this case, 
a closer look into the proposed compatibility structure is necessary. 
3. The	Blueprint’s	Approach	to	State	Aid	
As analysed above, the precautionary recapitalisation tool is a form of State aid 
which can only be granted in dire circumstances to provide an extra capital buffer to 
institutions likely to become distressed if economic conditions were to worsen 
materially.204 Yet, according to the Blueprint, the tool can also be accessed in the specific 
case of a transfer of impaired assets to a publicly supported AMC, in the cases in which 
the objectives pursued by such a transfer are the same as in the case of a direct capital 
injection and provided that the specific State aid conditions for IAMs are also 
respected.205 This is in particular the case when the removal of impaired assets from a 
bank’s balance sheet can achieve the same recapitalisation objective for the beneficiary 
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bank as a straight-forward injection of own funds or purchase of capital instruments.206 
In particular, the permission to sell NPLs at a price higher than the market price207 but 
lower than the assets’ REV,208 can be considered equivalent to the case of a direct 
injection of own funds, where the assets are still sold at market value but the State 
contributes with its own funds to make up the difference and to ensure that the bank 
maintains its capital position following the loss from the sale of its assets below their 
REV.209  
As such, according to the Blueprint the use of the precautionary recapitalisation 
tool becomes possible for the treatment of the NPLs issue as well. This of course requires 
the measures to also be proportionate, necessary and limited in terms of amount and 
time.210 The Blueprint sets out that these State aid approval requirements can be 
fulfilled through a conservative assessment of the assets’ estimated market value and 
REV to ensure that unlikely losses are correctly identified, the structuring of the AMC’s 
liability side in a manner that reduces the overall risk profile for the State (through a 
preference of guarantees over direct financing and attracting private capital to the 
maximum extent possible211), the provision of a clear exit strategy by either limiting the 
AMC’s lifespan or limiting the assets which the AMC can purchase to those with a fixed 
lifespan, and lastly, through the introduction of a mechanism that would ensure that the 
State will not bear losses higher than the difference between the transfer price and the 
market price, especially in the cases in which the estimated market price cannot be 
expected to sufficiently reflect the risk of a possible further deterioration of the 
market.212 Additionally, it is proposed that in the cases in which AMCs are backed by 
public guarantees, such support should also only be of limited time and include 
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remuneration clauses featuring a step-up fee on the guarantees to incentivise the 
ending of State support reliance as soon as possible, by making the alternative 
increasingly costly.213 All these measures are in place to limit State exposure to the 
absolute minimum necessary to secure financial stability, and as such align the Blueprint 
with the State aid framework. 
The combination of these features is crucial in order to allow for the safeguarding 
against taxpayer abuse when opening up the possibility of NPL transfers to State-backed 
AMCs. In fact, the Blueprint itself lays out the fact that AMCs should consider 
implementing specific safeguard mechanisms to protect taxpayers from future liabilities 
created by the transfers, such as time limits, financial limitations, risk management 
safeguards and other safeguards that will ensure the following of best market practices, 
whilst fully recognising the fact that this can lead to a trade-off between such protection 
and the efficiency of the AMC, necessitating a thorough cost-benefit assessment in each 
case.214 It is expected that the set up and functioning of the AMC based on public funding 
without these limitations will be weighed against the possible effect the NPLs will have 
on the economy of the Member State and the financial system in general absent their 
transfer.   
On a more elemental level, however, any transfer of NPLs to the AMC will have 
to be pursuant to the general principles of the State aid framework and BRRD, including 
the requirement for losses resulting from the future write-down of NPLs from their net 
book value and up to their transfer price to have to be covered by private means, the 
submission and implementation of a restructuring plan to return the bank to long-term 
viability, the limitation of State aid to the minimum necessary through burden-sharing 
and own contributions, and the limitation of possible distortions to competition.215 
Especially when it comes to the amount of the precautionary recapitalisation, 
which is dependent on the results of stress tests and asset quality reviews as specified 
in Article 32(4)(d)(iii) BRRD, it is crucial that AMCs cannot be used to offset incurred 
losses and losses likely to occur, meaning those stemming from the baseline stress test 
scenarios, which will have to be covered by private means. In the cases in which such 
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means are insufficient, and the institution would fall short of its prudential capital 
requirements, precautionary recapitalisation cannot be granted altogether.216 Instead, 
merely privately funded AMCs set up to operate without any State support will be able 
to assist. 
4. The	 Specific	 Safeguards	 Aimed	 at	 Securing	 a	 Fair	 Trade-off	
between	Financial	Stability	and	State	Risk	
In order for the desired result of any transfer towards an AMC to be achieved, it 
is necessary for AMCs to be set up in an efficient manner that will allow for the 
maximisation of their recovery values, whilst at the same time limiting any exposure of 
the State. After all, losses incurred by AMCs can burden the State balance sheet and 
adversely affect the value of residual NPLs, leading to an increase of contingent liabilities 
of the State and intensifying the negative feedback loop between the State and the 
banking system.217 For this reason, the Blueprint places a strong emphasis on the best 
practices to be followed when setting up AMCs in order to secure the containment of 
any outfall to hit the taxpayer in the rare cases in which extraordinary government 
support has been granted.  
In particular, the mandate and powers of AMCs should be laid down in 
legislation, allowing for transparency and the establishment and promotion of  
accountability through court challenges, whilst also allowing for the use of any relevant 
legal tool for the maximisation of profits, such as the taking and enforcement of 
collateral, 218 which can be crucial in securing their position and limiting the necessity of 
accessing public funds. At the same time, AMCs should operate as a private entities with 
full budgetary independence, in aims of reducing political interference with their 
operation, exposure to lobbying and political review,219 capable of skewing their degree 
of adherence to their primary mandate.  
In pursuance of this mandate, the type, scope and scale of the assets transferred 
to AMCs (asset perimeter) should be limited to the assets in which AMCs have a 
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demonstrated track record in recovering value,220 whilst still allowing for exceptions to 
these principles where such might be deemed prudent, e.g. where limited transfer of 
other exposures would allow beneficiary institutions to eliminate exposure to a 
particular business or region altogether.221 At the same time, a minimum and maximum 
size threshold should be imposed to limit granular exposures of AMCs and the problem 
of diminishing returns to scale respectively.222 As such, the permitted scale of transfers 
ought to strike a balance between the benefits accruing from economies of scale and 
the risk of a possible overburdening of the AMC rendering it incapable of performing its 
duties effectively.223  
When it comes to the establishment of a participation perimeter, the Blueprint 
rightly emphasises the necessity for the existence of a qualifying mandatory basis for 
the classification of banks required to participate in loan transfers to AMCs following a 
diagnostic exercise based on the asset perimeter.224 Were participation to be left at the 
sole discretion of the banks, this runs the risk of inaction, first-mover disadvantages, or 
even cherry-picking of the NPLs to be transferred,225 slowing down or even hindering 
the recovery of the wider economy. As such, whilst at first glance the increase of the 
number of NPLs to be taken on by a State funded AMC might seem counterintuitive, in 
the long run it can promote the health and stability of the financial system, by decreasing 
the possibility of a larger scale bail-out having to take place were the situation to be left 
to unfold unchecked. 
In regards to the funding and capital structure of the AMC, the Blueprint provides 
the possibility of such being structured on the basis of previously successful AMCs such 
as SAREB and NAMA.226 This includes a public-private partnership model in which the 
majority of the equity stake is provided by the private sector, ensuring the limitation of 
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the government’s exposure to less than 50% and limiting its control over the AMC’s 
operations.227 The acquisition of the impaired assets would ideally take on the form of 
issuance of senior unsecured bonds to the beneficiary banks, which would carry a full 
guarantee of the national Treasury and be eligible for the use as collateral in Eurosystem 
credit operations, following any first possible raising of market funding without a 
guarantee.228 In any instance in which government guarantees are provided, these 
would need to be in strict compliance with the State aid rules and remunerated 
accordingly,229 in order to limit State exposure and unjust distortions of competition. In 
any case, this funding arrangement operates on the assumption that the guarantees 
granted, being contingent liabilities of the government, have a remote probability of 
ever being called, due to the pricing of asset transfers and capital cushion of the AMC, 
and as such are unlikely to ever increase the stock of public debt.230  
Nevertheless, one of the most important safeguards to the public purse remains 
the inclusion of a sunset clause, albeit with the possibility of extension, limiting initially 
the lifespan of the AMC itself (with the goal of limiting the State’s expenditure in 
operating the AMC when certain NPL losses cannot be averted) and then the time period 
in which the purchase of impaired assets is possible, encouraging the immediate 
offloading of NPLs by institutions.  
The overall aim of limiting taxpayer exposure is, finally, completed with the 
inclusion of risk management safeguards, aimed at limiting the risk tolerance of the AMC 
through the promotion and setting of lower levels of accepted market, credit and 
liquidity risks.231 In particular, AMCs are encouraged to limit their exposure to currency 
risk and interest rate risk through the utilisation of currency-hedging and hedging 
practices respectively using derivative contracts, all the while managing the risk inherent 
in their financial asset portfolio.232 Especially considering AMCs’ non-subjection to 
particular capital requirements regulations, liquidity risk needs to be actively managed. 
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In this regard, the incorporation of ongoing liquidity stress-testing and maintenance of 
minimum liquidity buffers or cash reserves is promoted.233 
Finally, the fact that the Blueprint is not binding, but instead merely provides a 
guidance to Member States wishing to set up AMCs pursuant to the State Aid and 
Resolution frameworks, further promotes the base objective of securing financial 
stability, by allowing Member States to adapt the Blueprint to their particular 
circumstances as they find appropriate to combat the NPL issue as it takes form in their 
national economy and to modify any proposed operations and measures to their needs.  
It is the combination and interplay of these measures aimed at securing the 
smooth operation of the AMCs, and as such the limitation of the dependency on public 
funding, and their frictionless adherence to the BRRD and State aid requirements that 
promotes a fair trade-off between the public funding aspect of certain AMC forms and 
the burden such puts on the public. 
5. Criticism	
Whilst the AMC Blueprint constitutes an important step towards tackling 
Europe’s NPL issue, it fails to address certain underlying problems. 
The imposition of a 50% limit to public ownership, whilst an improvement to the 
alternative of unlimited public ownership, does not particularly secure the position of 
the State. Especially in the cases in which government exposure comes close to 50% or 
the amount of transferred liabilities is substantial, the hit a potential future write-down 
of these liabilities can have on public finance despite other safeguards is still 
considerable, making the setting of the limit at 50% a questionable choice.  
Additionally, as AMCs take on similar sets of liabilities as the originating banks 
yet are not subject to the same requirements and regulations, operating for the most 
part as alternative investment funds, their winding down at the end of their operation 
period can under circumstances further destabilise the economy in the cases in which 
the following of their mandate of working out the NPLs during their lifetime proved 
largely unsuccessful.   
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At the same time the amount of NPLs that AMCs can successfully take on is 
limited based on their own capital, which is unable to cover all NPLs exposures. This 
limits the possibility of their use in a similar manner as that of resolution funds.234 The 
issue is especially pronounced in the weaker economies with higher NPLs ratios, as it is 
unlikely that the private sector, whether with or without the help of the State, will be 
able to set up AMCs capable of working out the NPLs burden without severe State 
intervention to an extent that could further contribute to systemic instability. In this 
regard, it might be more prudent to set up a pan-European AMC that would allow for a 
more measured contribution to the AMC by each State. However, whilst this would be 
an important step towards establishing the Banking Union, the therewith associated 
requirement of cost mutualisation still poses an important political issue.
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Conclusions 
From the above analysis of the AMC Blueprint it becomes obvious that it does 
indeed provide for the possibility of using State funds in order to help remedy the issue 
the increased numbers of NPLs pose to the economy. Nevertheless, it does not allow for 
the almost arbitrary use of bail-out, making clear that any derogation from the strict 
private funding and burden-sharing requirements can only take place if first the 
requirements set out in the BRRD and the whole of the State aid framework are met. In 
fact, it does not envisage or provide for any possibility of derogation from the 
requirements set out therein. If anything, even when considering the application of the 
precautionary recapitalisation tool, the Blueprint promotes the imposition of additional 
considerations to limit the State’s exposure. Combined with the overall objective of 
securing AMCs’ smooth functioning and seamless integration into the system, the 
Blueprint’s safeguards promote measures aimed at limiting and reducing the 
dependence on public funds, albeit not always successfully. 
However, it is important to consider the fact that the Blueprint was not adopted 
as an autonomous measure aimed at tackling the NPL issue by opening it up to the 
application of State aid. This was already possible on the basis of the TFEU, the Crisis 
Communications and the BRRD. Instead, it is but a part of a larger comprehensive new 
package aimed at fostering financial stability in the EU with its goal being merely to 
provide guidance to the Member States wanting to set up an AMC whilst navigating the 
complicated legal landscape of State aid and the resolution framework. In this sense, 
the AMC Blueprint more than fulfils its objective, without having an influence on the 
choices of the Member States regarding the use of public funds, other than having 
provided a clear overview of their options and the consequences and repercussions of 
each.    
As such, it can be held that the AMC Blueprint, the BRRD and the Crisis 
Communications all go hand in hand, working towards the securement of an equal and 
fair Single Market characterised by financial stability and limited State exposure to 
sector specific losses. 
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